REVIEW ESSAY

Beneath the Surface of the Self: Psychoanalysis and the Unseen Known


Jeffrey Prager
University of California, Los Angeles

Many sociologists today express dissatisfaction with a reigning sociological orthodoxy in which the individual is understood simply as both cognitive and reasoning, and where action is conceptualized—as in rational choice modeling—principally as calculating and purposive. Among contemporary sociological theorists, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, and Pierre Bourdieu, each in his own way registers an appreciation of social action's complexity, for which rationality and reason can only account for a dimension of it, not simply accounted for by those categories. Sociological interest in phenomenology and the experience of a lived reality, for example, beginning with Alfred Schutz, extending to Harold Garfinkel, and now in the work of Jack Katz exemplifies a recurring desire to better capture the nature of lived experience in situ. The work of Thomas Scheff and many in the field of the sociology of emotions similarly express interest in a more robust conception of the self. The "cognitive turn" in social science, for example, as described in recent work of Rogers Brubaker, also similarly demonstrates an aspiration for a more vigorous psycholog-

1 Direct correspondence to Jeffrey Prager, Department of Sociology, University of California, 264 Haines Hall, Los Angeles, California 90095. E-mail: jprager@soc.ucla.edu

© 2006 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0002-9602/2006/11201-0007$10.00

276 AJS Volume 112 Number 1 (July 2006): 276–90
Review Essay

ical sociology. Social constructionism broadly defined, despite the remarkably productive work it has done over the past decades to open up sociological analysis to meaning making in social formations, nonetheless appears today to be running out of steam (for a critique, see, e.g., Hacking 1999). The insights that could be mined seem to have been, with new work hampered by an insufficiently complex understanding of who the meaning makers are, the range of internal factors they are responding to, and their complex, subjectively informed relation to their external world. To Ian Hacking’s question “The social construction of what?” I would add “Social construction by whom?” Since contemporary psychoanalysis is preeminently concerned with a self as constituted through its relations to others, one might think that sociologists naturally would be turning to current psychoanalytic literature for a consideration of the parameters and constraints on meaningfulness, the contribution of a person’s depth psychology to the constitution and reconstitution of social life. But this interdisciplinary cross-fertilization by and large has not occurred.

Sociology in the United States has, over the years, drawn a line in the sand demarcating (and perhaps foreclosing) it from psychoanalysis. On the one side, Erving Goffman, though often in his writings demonstrating his knowledge of psychoanalysis, in Asylums (Goffman 1961) and elsewhere uses conventional psychiatric notions of the person as a foil to offer instead a sociological perspective on social interaction, explicitly disclaiming the need to understand a person’s inner world before understanding patterns of behavior between social actors. On the other side, there is no telling what effect Talcott Parson’s embrace of Freudian ideas has had on the current tainted status the latter now experiences within sociology: a guilt, perhaps, by association. Thus American sociology, rather than productively engaging Freud and his followers, has largely succeeded in building a firewall against them. The result has been to overlook important developments in contemporary psychoanalysis that engage relevant themes of sociological interest.

Beginning in the 1960s and now emerging as the dominant paradigm within psychoanalysis, the relation between self and others is the principal preoccupation of current analytic writers. Consider these topics for their sociological relevance: The role of the other and a “facilitating environment” in self-formation and in healthy psychological development (e.g., Winnicott 1971; Kohut 1984), the discovery of the conditions, when they obtain, that generate more-or-less concordant interactions between an individual’s inner world and the external (e.g., Chodorow 1978, 1999), the description of the processes by which “objective reality” necessarily becomes acted upon as if really an emanation of subjective experience, and consideration of the nature and process of repair between the two when disharmony, or pathology, best exemplify the relationship (e.g., Ben-
American Journal of Sociology

jamin 1988). Psychoanalytic attention, in fact, to misperception and the capacity of subjective experience to distort social relations so as to better conform to a psychic reality sharply at odds with externalities speak to a sociological interest, for example, in ideologies or other meaning systems that transform social reality to conform to the subjective views held about it, and which then frame actions within it.

In short, while psychoanalysis may not be for every sociologist, it strikes me as mandatory reading for those among us interested in issues of agency and motivation, those searching for a deeper truly social psychology or those grappling with constructionist and postmodern epistemological issues. It should be required for all social scientists dissatisfied with simplistic or reductionistic claims of rational choice theory, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience regarding the nature and sources of motives. Psychoanalysis can no longer be simply dismissed for its rigid orthodoxy because, like sociology, it is now a field that presumes the formation of individual depth psychology as forged in the crucible of the social unit. For these sets of concerns, sociologists would do well to engage analytic writings. The books reviewed here, largely accessible to the nonspecialist, document this shift in psychoanalysis over the past decades away from a focus on the person (defined almost exclusively in terms of instinctual drives) in isolation from others. They describe instead an understanding of the individual as thoroughly social, constituted through his or her encounters with others, beginning first in the baby-mother dyad and moving outward to other social relationships as well. These books also help frame certain of the potential contours of a psychoanalytically informed sociology.

Peter Fonagy, author of Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis, is Freud Memorial Professor of Psychoanalysis at University College London, director of research at the Anna Freud Center, and director of the Menninger Clinical Outcomes Research and Effectiveness Center. He is a practicing analyst and a prolific researcher and author. He has made significant research contributions to psychoanalytic developmental theory, refining and elaborating the field’s central claims that early childhood experiences are formative in later life development. In this book, Fonagy revisits the rupture that occurred in the 1940s between psychoanalysis and John Bowlby’s attachment studies of the affectional bonds between infants and their caregivers; he then offers an update of the current status of the two fields.

Fonagy summarizes Bowlby’s original interactional understanding of the human being in which he described as primary the instinct of an infant to attach to his or her caregiver. For Bowlby, survival indeed depends on the presence of those sensitive and sufficiently responsive to this basic need of the infant. Strongly influenced by ethology and animal-
based research, Bowlby insists that this drive hardly distinguishes humans from other mammals; rather, it is a feature of biology shared with other species. Bowlby and his followers understood variation in human behavior as a result of varieties of attachment and the kind and nature of patterns of security achieved between infant and caregiver. In this same naturalistic spirit, attachment theory over the years, as Fonagy (p. 15) describes, is increasingly influenced by cognitive psychology and particularly by the informational processing model of neural and cognitive functioning. In the end, attachment theory has allied itself with a perspective of behavior in which human psychology is defined wholly naturalistically, what I have described elsewhere (Prager 1998) as a part of a broader scientific trend to produce an antipsychological psychology.

Bowlby's finding that attachment behavior is biologically mandated—part of the human behavioral system—challenged and circumvented the psychoanalytic roots of his own training. His central claim that attachment is biologically hardwired insured this break. Attachment theory, in contrast with psychoanalysis, allies itself with a far more scientific and mechanistic understanding of the self. Biologically determined and cognitively inscribed, attachment theorists have shown relatively little interest for the complex processes by which individuals attach meanings to their impulses and reconcile ideational content with bodily feelings and virtually no interest in ways in which systematic distortions in perception are possible. Bowlby may have been ahead of his time in suggesting that sociality is a function of a brain processing system activated by survival needs, but the enormous burst of interest both in cognitive psychology and neuroscience to explain human behavior reflects a powerful desire to account for the social world as synchronous with basic and irrefutable human needs.

Yet from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the connection between brain functioning and biological instinct short-circuits attention to the powerful role that psychic reality—the mind as distinct from the brain—plays in the shaping and acting toward the world outside the person. This divide between attachment theory's aspiration to understand human behavior as simply a subset of animal behavior, linked to ethological research, and psychoanalytic resistance to such claims, over the years has largely succeeded in placing psychoanalysis outside normal science. Does experimental evidence exist to demonstrate the existence of the human unconscious, of a mind that gives meaning to personal needs and desires? Bowlby effectively abandons the psychoanalytic assertion that psychic drives—aggression and libido—constitute a unique human configuration, distinctive from other species, and he rejects the analytic claim that these drives, not synonymous with biological need, express themselves in idiosyncratic forms of meaning making and self-expression unique to each
individual. For the psychoanalyst, human beings, in contrast to other animals, are driven to chart, largely unconsciously, the often-times treacherous developmental waters within the family of love and hate, loss, conflict, and ambivalence. The various ways these motives are managed are both formative in later life and define variations between individuals and their distinctive subjectivities.

In writing *Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis*, Fonagy marks the substantial distance recently traveled toward rapprochement between Bowlby’s original formulations and current thinking in psychoanalysis. He describes the more recent blurring of boundaries between contemporary psychoanalytic and neuroscientific formulations of the human mind. On the one side, psychoanalysis in recent decades has become far more sensitive and responsive to the demands for evidence-based research to support claims made of the developmental history of the individual and the powerful role of unconscious fantasy in forging psychic reality. Peter Fonagy with his team of collaborators has become an influential voice within the psychoanalytic community for empirical science, and this group has published extensively his experimental evidence on infant-parent relationships (see, e.g., Fonagy et al. 2002). His work helps define the interactional conditions that contribute to the shaping of mental representations of the self and others, produced in the context of primary relationships. These representations are hardly mere reflections of the survival instinct—effluxes or residues of “real” drives as posited by attachment theorists—but constitute an original framework achieved idiosyncratically and based upon each person’s unique “reading” of one’s own bodily states and one’s experience of other people. Mental representations, Fonagy argues, organize on-going self-understanding and action throughout life (and are not simply recordings of “real” interactions) and therefore require treatment as independent sources that shape conscious motivations, goals, and desires. Fonagy elsewhere describes the achievement of psychic reality—the unconsciously shaped sphere of innerness that demarcates oneself from the external world—as the development of the capacity to mentalize. But mentalization, Fonagy argues, is not an instinctive function—even as Freud might have described it in terms of stages of psychosexual development—but a coachievement of self and meaningful others (just as attachment theorists posited), where the thinking and feeling individual accomplishes, only with the complicity of a supporting environment, a sense of demarcation from caregivers and the illusion of autonomy and independence. It is also an achievement that for various reasons can go awry. That is where psychoanalytic treatment enters the picture and, in specifying the social conditions that interfere with healthy mentalization, also where sociological analysis may be relevant.
If in important respects psychoanalysis has sought to incorporate important insights of attachment theory, especially its emphasis on the role of the caregiver in the development of a mentalizing infant, Fonagy also documents the ways in which attachment theory has necessarily moved toward psychoanalysis. The emergence of trauma and abuse as central topics for scientific analysis has made attachment theorists more interested in the problem of pathology and in the ways in which social experience can generate distortions or misperceptions of self and other. The relationship between the need for attachment, and the inner representations of self and other, in other words, may not always be synchronous. Psychoanalytic practitioners’ capacity to discover and uncover the system of unconscious thoughts and feelings has now gained greater attention by those interested in survivability, recognizing the role that irrationality can play in a persons encounter with others, with his or her world, and with his or her past. These (perhaps reluctant) overtures to psychoanalytic research run parallel to contemporary neuroscience’s own interest in psychoanalysis, where the discovery of the problems of misreadings of physical states, of misremembering the past, and misperceptions of the external world all demonstrate the presence of the unconscious and its capacity to deceive. With these facts in mind, what is emerging is a more multifaceted picture of self-structuring than can be offered by an exclusively biological instinct-driven theory. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1999), for example, by describing in The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness the “embodied mind” links the lived experiences of individuals to a brain motivated in thought and affect to represent bodily states—states that are the product of a unique experientially based history.

Here we might see the benefit of consulting psychoanalysis to broaden our sociological thinking beyond the “cognitive turn” currently conceived as an important antidote to the problem of social misperceptions. Rogers Brubaker has recently noted that researchers’ own participation in the cultural world that they study tends to produce a collapse of categories, classification systems, and schemas employed in social analysis to those employed by social actors and the “commonsense” categories that underlay practical action. The frequently articulated mantra within the academy that ethnic and racial groups, for example, are not “real” but socially constructed has paradoxically, Brubaker observes, not generated any real shift in social analyses: these groups are nonetheless treated by those studying the phenomena as if they are real. “Despite the constructivist stance that has come to prevail among sophisticated analysts,” he writes, “the study of ethnicity remains informed by ‘groupism’: by the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and even races as things-in-the-world, as real, substantial entities with their own cultures, identities, and interests”
American Journal of Sociology

(Brubaker 2004, p.78). The insights of cognitive psychologists and anthropologists, Brubaker argues, enables a greater appreciation of the culturally in situ relation of categories of practical action that ought not themselves be the arbiters of categories of social analysis. He directs researchers to be more fully cognizant of classification schemes as social productions, thereby to more effectively prevent reifying these groups as real.

In effect, Brubaker marshals cognitive claims about the nature of the social world to strengthen science’s conceptual arsenal and to help distance the social analyst from taken-for-granted cultural assumptions of group differences. The goal is to establish an objective domain of inquiry not contaminated by preexisting cultural presumptions about the reality of group differences. Brubaker holds out the hope that indeed it is possible that researchers might create a more robust bulwark of objectivity against their own propensity to construct categories of social analysis along the lines of their own everyday participation in the social world they analyze. Yet while certainly a step in the right direction, classification systems themselves only begin to explain social actors’ and researchers’ difficulties in not treating as real the socially created character of various social groupings. Yet contemporary psychoanalysis, with its exploration of the unconscious roots—the tacit, taken-for-granted, presumed—that find their way into social analysis, might well add to this cognitive critique of social constructedness. What better arena to explore the irrationality of thought, “the power of feelings” and its capacity to structure reality, and the devastating consequences these putative differences between individuals hold for social life than in the sphere of ethnic and racial relations? And perhaps what better place to begin than to attempt to examine the intersubjective roots—here between researcher and researched—for Brubaker’s observation that despite the rationalist claims that particular groupings of people are not “real,” social researchers have not been able to extricate themselves from the very categories that help reinforce the experience of their “realness”? The persistence of racial and ethnic conflict compels us to move, in short, beyond the insight of the importance of cognitive categories in shaping social life and, to include unconscious motives and their emotional potency—the “erotics” of categories—that help make the process of classification, schematization, and categorization itself constitutive of social action.

Daniel Stern, in The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life, describes the benefits of finely grained deep-structure analysis of the moment—a feature of psychoanalytic treatment—both to discover through it an understanding of the individual and interactional structures that helped produce the moment and to develop an understanding of the possibilities for structural transformations. Stern is honorary professor of
psychology at the University of Geneva, adjunct professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the Cornell Medical School, and on the faculty at the Columbia University Center for Psychoanalytic Training and Research. Trained both as a psychoanalyst and a developmental psychologist, he is best known for his 1985 book *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology*. A path-breaking and very influential book that laid the empirical groundwork for an intersubjective theory of the self, it describes in great clinical detail the building up of a self. Among his most impressive and surprising findings is evidence that selfhood begins almost at the moment of birth. Stern documents its beginnings in earliest infancy, consolidating over time. Selfhood’s expression matures as the infant matures, moving from an emergent self, to a core, subjective and finally verbal self. This self-development does not occur unilaterally but is deeply dependent on processes of affective mirroring between infant and caregiver. Stern describes, moreover, the ways in which later experiences of selfhood presume and build upon earlier gains, a structuring of the self that represents a consolidation of affective experiences that precedes both self-awareness and verbalization, and all of which occurs within an environment enabling differentiation and individuation to proceed. Earlier elaborations of selfhood do not disappear but remain as frames that help to organize and interpret later in-the-moment experience.

*The Present Moment*, among its other contributions, restates the differences that remain between psychoanalysis and an unconstructed attachment theory. The intersubjective drive, what Stern characterizes as “a primary motivational system,” is not for biologically driven fulfillment—that is, the physical survival of the infant—but for psychological gratification and pleasure. Basic psychological needs require others in order to be fulfilled, and they help define an individual’s orientation to the other at any given moment. For Stern, individuals are motivated to read the intentions and feelings of others so as to establish contact between self and other, and, through others, to help make contact with the self, “to define, maintain, or reestablish self-identity and self-cohesion” (Stern 1985, p. 107). Relationships are unrelentingly suffused with both memory and desire: the discovery of the power of the affect is synonymous with the uncovering of unconscious memory that frames that relationship and the desires which propel action forward. Interactions are of course surface phenomenon that can be described in great detail, but at the same time unfold as a result of the unconscious meanings and affects activated from the past that help give shape and meaning to the present moment.

Rather than attempting to describe a moment as a natural occurrence and interrogating it for the special information it yields in the spirit of, say, Husserl or Schutz, Stern posits the relevance of hidden self structures,
American Journal of Sociology

a system of motives, that lay underneath and that produce it, as well as the invocation of unconscious meanings that help frame the relation between self and other. For Stern, moments cannot be disentangled from the motivations that generate them. The analytic relationship, characterized by the over-time mobilization of instinct and unconscious emotion between analyst and analysand, yields at times exquisitely important moments, when affect, insight, and a willingness to experience the world differently converge and manifest themselves at a particular instant in the name of personal transformation. Thus, Stern here suggests that the uniqueness of these moments is not discovered through a mere description of their detail but is uncovered, first, by the work of making conscious the unconscious meanings these relationships hold, partially rooted in the past, that are being co-created at the time. And second, knowledge is gleaned through understanding the unconscious memories and desires that have become activated through the interaction between self and other. Stern suggests that the significance of moments in everyday life, like the analytic dyad, is similarly intersubjectively created and interpretable intersubjectively.

Psychoanalysis, in short, provides a form of knowing that demarcates it from other modes of social analysis. It is unique because of its willingness to build into sociological observation, and thereby to test, a theory of individual motivation. It presumes that the moment, as Stern describes it, constitutes only a surface manifestation of that which cannot be seen, a phenomenal expression knowable only by interpreting its deeper sources. And psychoanalysis is also unique because of its claim that knowing is a thoroughly and necessarily intersubjective achievement. To apprehend a moment’s particular significance, both members of the dyad—the observer and the observed—are actively engaged from their own vantage point in uncovering hidden motives and discovering their multilayered meaning.

Here then is an emendation to the recent work of Jack Katz who in his How Emotions Work (1999) powerfully challenges what he refers to as a “two-dimensional” version of the self, one that does not acknowledge the ways in which selfhood is “refracted elaborately within.” Sociology, Katz argues, has been effectively trapped in a conception of the “looking-glass self,” where people are understood as designing versions of who they are in relation to others’ expectations and responses. But individuals are continually surprising themselves with a “third dimension” of selfhood, discovering within themselves elements that they may not know existed. As he argues, the writings both of Erving Goffman and symbolic interactionism attempt to account for the constructed character of selfhood but, in limiting their understanding of selfhood by employing this metaphor of construction, they fail to acknowledge the ways in which the
Review Essay

body in which the self resides—or, as I might put it, that which is outside of conscious subjective control—sometimes makes its own independent contribution, beneath the surface and outside of cognition.

Katz in introducing the “embodied self,” like Brubaker, takes on the complacency with which the discourse of social constructionism currently operates and seeks to align sociological analysis with a different tradition of thought, one less cognitive and dualistically Cartesian. “An alternative view,” he writes, “presented in mid-century philosophy by Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and still struggling to work its way into empirical social science, holds that a person exists in the first place as a being thrown into the world, doing things, including the self-reflection of thinking and social interaction, while already and more fundamentally being corporeally engaged with other people and other things” (1999, p. 142). Katz, indeed, here comes very close to contemporary psychoanalytic formulations though, in the spirit of naturalistic analysis, he claims a kind of agnosticism concerning how the actors unconscious contributes to a moment’s production. In its place, as a research strategy he invokes a method of “analytic induction,” a process where he encourages an ever more subtle appreciation by the observer-cum-scientist of the elements of the visible, so as not to have to resort to any conception of the invisible (see Katz 1999, p. 347n11) or the theoretical.

Hans Loewald, a student of Martin Heidegger and a prominent American psychoanalyst and writer, is now emerging as a central figure in relational psychoanalysis. His importance to modern psychoanalysis has been not as fully appreciated as it might have been (among psychoanalysts) because his writings are often obscure and opaque and because his formulations, despite offering a radical revision of early Freudian constructions, remain couched largely in the original vocabulary of Freud. Thus, he has been often treated as a contemporary carrier of earlier psychoanalytic ideas. Nonetheless, it is striking that both Stephen Mitchell, in his book Relationality: From Attachment to Intersubjectivity, and Jonathan Lear, in Therapeutic Action single out Loewald’s contributions as pivotal to the new psychoanalysis. As I will describe, Loewald’s formulations of the individual to the collectivity, and the social origins of minded activity—his theory of ontogenesis—offer an important bridge between contemporary psychoanalysis and a new sociology, to which Brubaker and Katz, among others, are indicating the need.

Stephen Mitchell, before his untimely death in 2000 not long after the publication of this book, was emerging as a central figure in contemporary psychoanalysis. He was a founding editor of an important new journal Psychoanalytic Dialogues: A Journal of Relational Perspectives and a prolific writer, outlining both for a general audience and a more technical one the contours of a relational psychoanalysis. In Relationality he iden-
American Journal of Sociology

tifies Loewald as the philosophical inspiration behind intersubjectivity. And in several opening chapters that beautifully explicate his thought, he demonstrates the Loewaldian perspective that forms the foundation of current analytic thinking, one that is as beholden to Loewald's training with Heidegger as it was to Freud.

For Loewald, selfhood emerges from first experiences of primal density, that period in early infancy in which the capacity to distinguish between inner and outer, self and other are not yet possible (see, e.g., Loewald 2000). Before any sense of inner world and external reality existed, an undifferentiated field consisting of baby and caregiver(s) constitutes primary experience. Mitchell writes: "We begin, Loewald suggests, with experience in which there is no differentiation between inside and outside, self and other, actuality and fantasy, past and present. All these dichotomies, which we come think of as givens, as basic features of the way the world simply is, are for Loewald complex constructions. They arise slowly over the course of our early years and operate as an overlay, a parallel mode of organizing experience that accompanies and coexists with experiences generated by the original, primal unity" (p. 4). For Loewald (like Freud), early experience never disappears, and the primal density—the first state—is part of the hidden residues of life which forever contribute to the ways in which individuals interpret the world they occupy, and which motivate them toward that world. So, unlike Freud and classical attachment theorists, for Loewald and the intersubjectivists in the beginning is not the individual—isolated and instinct-driven to attach to others—but rather the nondifferentiated field, from which the individual over time comes to separate and in-a-fashion differentiate. Secondary process—rational, reflective, cognitive, and conscious understandings of the world captured in narrative forms and in the visible—continually expresses this "illusion" of separateness, and it is that to which an individual has access. But secondary process always vies with primary process experience: the dedifferentiated, nonrational, preverbal, sensory, and unconscious feelings that preceded the "illusion" of separateness and upon which selfhood is built. As Loewald describes it, psychoanalysis is the occasion when communication may become reestablished between secondary processes that forswear the existence of an unconscious, that is, "the indestructible matrix of all subsequent experiences" (p. 25) that makes itself felt, especially when it has been ignored, through symptoms that interfere with the healthy functioning of the individual. Beyond its therapeutic aims, psychoanalysis alerts us to the consequentiality of the invisible in social action, to the ways that these primary experiences motivate individuals and provide an important self-referential context of interpretation and meaning making of the external world. The task, certainly borrowing from Heidegger, is the experience "best be called being"
that individuals forever attempt to reproduce through their life activity (p.42). A theory of psychoanalytic intersubjectivity, as provided by Loewald, helps us understand how the social world has the capacity to be transformed to conform to the image and needs required of it as dictated by unconscious, unaccounted for personal motives. As Jonathan Lear coins it, also in describing the work of Hans Loewald, intersubjectivity offers up a concept of "subjective objectivity," as the objective world cannot but be suffused and affected by the meaningfulness toward it offered by its members. It is just here that Freud and Heidegger converge.

But Jonathan Lear's book is more than an excursus on the writings of Hans Loewald, his psychoanalytic mentor who became, over time, his close personal friend. It is not really an explication of the contours of contemporary intersubjective psychoanalysis, though it promotes that enterprise. Rather, *Therapeutic Action* demonstrates psychoanalytic intersubjectivity in action. Lear, a philosopher at the University of Chicago and a practicing analyst, applies the principles upon which intersubjectivity are based to his personal encounter with the writings of Loewald. Lear expresses through a beautiful prose the personal process of his apprehension and explication of the man and his works. Rather than being an *experience-distant* defense of a particular kind of scientific objectivity, it demonstrates the ways in which science itself, and the knowledge it generates, draws upon unconscious, *experience-near* wishes, commitments, and desires of the scientist and mobilizes them on behalf of rationality. This book is less an objective insistence on intersubjectivity than a revelation of it. Lear draws upon and shares with the reader not only the intellectual reasons for the book but discloses to the readers the personal reasons, uniquely his own, that inspired the book.

On the surface, *Therapeutic Action* is Lear's effort to explicate the meaning and significance of an especially important but difficult essay of Hans Loewald entitled "On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis" (1960). But Lear does not start on the surface of the text but begins his book rather with his personal relationship with Loewald and particularly with Loewald's comment immediately prior to his death that he hoped that after his death "there would never be any Loewaldians." Lear asks: What could be the meaning of this wish, why was it wished for, and how might one uncover the special meaning these words may have held for Loewald? If this productive, engaged and committed psychoanalyst wished ultimately that he would never have any followers, what might that reveal about his understanding of psychoanalysis, of knowledge, and of the relation of future psychoanalysts to the science of psychoanalysis? And, why, then write? Lear turns to a reading of Loewald's writings with the idea that they prefigure, and provide insight, to Loewald's closing comment.
Lear offers this personal moment not as an aside to the book’s main task at hand, but as powerful impulse behind it. The conundrum finally posed by Loewald at the time of his death shapes Lear’s reading of Loewald’s texts and, as any good psychoanalyst might proceed, he uses Loewald’s final words as an instrument to discover meanings Loewald’s previously buried (i.e., lying unconscious) in these earlier writings. Lear moves back and forth dialectically between symptom and unconscious source, hoping to shed new light both on the communicative intent of the symptom as well as understanding more deeply—the written text—the impulse that generated it. To adumbrate sharply Lear’s discovery, he concludes that Loewald’s essay stands as his manifesto on behalf of a psychoanalytic commitment to irony, a position he only made explicitly clear as he spoke to Lear at the end of his life. As Lear now reads it, this classic text expressed distally, in a scientific language, what Loewald, only very late in his life, was able to express in experience-near language: one should not experience the world as if it is just what it seems, but one should always hold to a healthy skepticism about our knowledge about it. To become a Loewaldian, in short, would be to believe the objective world as known, when the task of the scientist, for Loewald, is to ever be mindful of the ways in which unconscious impulses—primary experience—influences objective knowledge; the knowingness of the world is, therefore, always incomplete. This, for Loewald, is the ultimate contribution of psychoanalysis to science, a contribution that places both unconscious motives and intersubjectivity as part and parcel of the scientific enterprise.

The scientist, as Lear elaborates, like the psychoanalyst, is a subjective designation—not an objective one—and means situating oneself, first, in a certain relation to one’s own unconscious desires to know the world perfectly and completely and, second, in a relation to a world whose perfect knowing will ever remain elusive. Irony, for Lear, is to embrace this stance of subjective objectivity. We act toward the world—or a part of the world—as if we know it, but always stand poised to learn from it and to be altered by it. Lear writes about the psychoanalyst and his or her ironic stance to what about psychic life is known: “Psychoanalyst is a subjective category: the process of shaping oneself into a psychoanalyst is one that never comes to an end. One is constantly learning from one’s analysands, from other analysts, and from the interpretation and reinterpretation of what is going on with oneself and with others. This is not simply the exercise of the capacity (or set of capacities) to be a psychoanalyst—in the sense that once that capacity is established, all one need do is exercise it. Rather, the capacity itself is always being shaped, deepened, and extended. . . . Part of the internalization of the capacity to be a psychoanalyst is the recognition that this process of internalization must
Review Essay

always be incomplete” (p. 91). Lear extends this analysis to the medical doctor more generally, but it is one that can be applied to the scientist as well and to an account of the appropriateness of an ironic stance between the scientist and his or her discovery. No one provides a more powerful or persuasive demonstration of the intersubjective basis of scientific discovery than does Lear himself in the pages of this book.

It would not be accurate if this review left the impression that consensus exists within psychoanalysis concerning intersubjectivity. Considerable controversy still exists within psychoanalytic circles with regard to relational psychoanalysis and the developmental theories upon which they are based. Even among psychoanalytic “intersubjectivists,” there is a broad range of perspectives concerning the term itself and its implications for psychoanalytic treatment. Nonetheless, there is little question—as these books illustrate—that psychoanalysis, when compared to its past, has adopted a relational theory of the person. At a time when in sociology social constructionism, while not discredited for the insights it has shed on the relation between the social world and the individuals who compose it, is now being identified as incomplete, and when contemporary events in today’s world provide a prima facie case against the simply rational and calculative individual, it would behoove sociologists to consider the corpus of new psychoanalytic work, of which these books are exemplars, that exhibit similar signs of dissatisfaction with its reigning orthodoxy.

REFERENCES


American Journal of Sociology
